We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a (1 + ε )-approximate equilibrium in ArrowDebreu markets with weak gross substitute property. It applies to an unknown market setting without exact knowledge about the number of agents, their individual utilities, and endowments. Instead, our algorithm only uses price queries to a global demand oracle. This is the first polynomial-time algorithm for most of the known tractable classes of Arrow-Debreu markets, which computes such an equilibrium with a number of calls to the demand oracle that is polynomial in log 1/ε and avoids heavy machinery such as the ellipsoid method.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of market equilibrium is central in economics and captures fair, stable, and efficient outcomes in competitive allocation scenarios. The most prominent model to study market equilibria are exchange markets [2] , which consist of a set of divisible goods and a set of agents. Each agent has an initial endowment of goods and a utility (preference) function over bundles of goods.
Given prices of goods, each agent buys a most preferred bundle (called demand) that is affordable from the earned money. At equilibrium, market clears (i.e., demand meets supply).
The computation of market equilibrium is a fundamental problem in economics and computer science [3, 27, 28, 45] . The challenge is to provide algorithms to compute an (approximate) market equilibrium efficiently. After more than a decade of research on this issue in theoretical computer science [9, 10, 16, 17, 22, 35, 50] , there is a fairly good understanding of tractable and intractable domains (assuming P PPAD). For exchange markets, the tractable case is essentially 1 given by markets with a weak gross substitute (WGS) property, where any increase in prices of a set of goods does not strictly decrease the demand of unaffected goods. This includes markets with many popular and interesting classes of utility functions [41] , such as utilities with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with 0 < ρ < 1, Cobb-Douglas utilities, linear utilities, or utilities with spending constraints 2 [24, 49] .
Even beyond the economic interpretation, algorithms for computing market equilibria have wide applicability. For example, proportionally fair allocations, which result from market equilibria, are widely used in the design of computer networks [40] . Recent applications also include energy-efficient scheduling [38] and fair allocation of indivisible resources [1, 5, 18, 20, 32] . In the latter application, combinatorial polynomial-time algorithms are developed for variants of linear markets, for which no convex programming formulation is known.
A prerequisite for all of these efficient algorithms is the entire description of the market including number of agents, their utility functions, and initial endowments. Obtaining this description is a highly non-trivial task; an entire theory of revealed preferences [44, 47, 48] was developed to study how to infer market parameters from observed prices and buying patterns. Further, sometimes agents' preferences can be complicated, and their utility function may not have any succinct representation. This gives rise to the following question: Can we design efficient algorithms that are oblivious to a priori knowledge of market parameters? In other words, are there efficient algorithms for unknown markets, where one can learn the correct prices only via aggregate demand feedback?
In this work, we design a simple ascending-price algorithm for WGS exchange markets. Under the standard assumptions that the most preferred bundles are unique and continuous in all prices, our algorithm computes a strongly (1 + ε)-approximate market equilibrium [17] in polynomial time (i.e., in time polynomial in market parameters and log 1/ε). In these states, all buyers spend exactly their endowment. Moreover, for every buyer individually, it is guaranteed that she receives a bundle of goods with a utility that is at most a factor (1 + ε) worse than the optimal bundle. In addition, our algorithms only rely on aggregate demand feedback, and only require polynomially bounded precision in the numbers.
In markets with linear and spending constraint utilities, the uniqueness and continuity assumptions do not hold. Thus, even with tie-breaking rules that imply the WGS property, the existing algorithms for general WGS markets are not applicable. Instead, our algorithm can be adapted when using an appropriate tie-breaking rule for demands. In contrast to the FPTAS [24] for spending constraint exchange markets with a running time that depends on 1/ε 2 , the running time of our algorithm only grows with a factor of log 1/ε. Notably, this log 1/ε-dependence allows us to convert an approximate equilibrium to an exact one in polynomial time when given all utility parameters. Thus, we obtain the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact market equilibrium for spending constraint utilities and settle an open question raised by Duan and Mehlhorn [26] .
All of our results are achieved by a unifying framework that works directly on the price vector. It uses simple binary search to identify suitable multiplicative price updates for subsets of goods. As such, our approach is extremely easy to implement and, in particular, avoids black-box use of the ellipsoid method. Furthermore, by working on the full generality of exchange markets, our algorithms can be applied to the simpler case of Fisher markets [8] . 3 To compute approximate equilibria, our algorithms do not require access to an explicit description of the utility functions and endowments of the agents. Instead, the number of agents, the agents' endowments, and utilities all remain unknown. As in the case of tâtonnement algorithms [6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 19, 46] , we assume that these parameters can only be queried implicitly via aggregate demand queries. In such a query, we present a non-negative price for each good. For each agent, the oracle translates the endowment of each agent into money and determines a utility-maximizing bundle of goods for the money. It then aggregates the demands for each good and returns the vector of aggregate demands as an answer to the query. Note that for many WGS markets, these demand oracles can be easily implemented. For example, for CES utilities, there are even closed-form formulas. For suitable tie breaking, we can even apply the algorithms to unknown markets with linear and spending constraint utilities, which have non-continuous demand. Perhaps surprisingly, our tâtonnement-style algorithms succeed to implicitly detect all relevant information and changes in preferences in an unknown market setting. This requires overcoming a number of technical challenges and introduction of new techniques that we discuss in more detail in the following.
Our approach overcomes significant restrictions in some previous tâtonnement-style algorithms to compute equilibria in exchange markets [16, 31, 36] . These algorithms either use the ellipsoid method and convex feasibility programs but need to add auxiliary buyers to the markets [16] , or apply only to linear markets and rely on a careful assignment and reallocation for each individual buyer upon price change [36] , or provide weak convergence guarantees in the sum of all excess demands over all goods but yield no guarantee on the (individual) optimality of the assigned bundles [31] .
Model and Notation
Exact and approximate market equilibrium. In an exchange market, there is a set A of n agents and a set G of m goods. Each agent i has an initial endowment w i j ∈ R ≥0 of good j. By default, we use index i to denote agents and index j to denote goods throughout the article. We denote the total endowment of good j by w j = i ∈A w i j . Without loss of generality, we choose the units of measurement such that w j = 1, ∀j ∈ G. An allocation x = (x i j ) i ∈A, j ∈G is an assignment of goods to agents such that x i j ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G, and i x i j = 1. Each agent i has a utility function u i (x i ) that specifies the value agent receives from his bundle x i . An (exact) market equilibrium is a pair (x, p), where x is an allocation and p = (p j ) j ∈G is a vector of non-negative prices p j ≥ 0. In a market equilibrium, each agent obtains a budget of money by selling his endowment at the given prices. Then x i represents a utility-maximizing bundle of goods that he can afford to buy at the current prices for his budget. We call such a bundle a demand bundle of agent i. In addition, we say x j = i x i j is the demand for good j in allocation x.
is a market equilibrium if (1) x i is a demand of agent i at p, and (2) i x i j = 1 for each good j ∈ G. If a pair (x, p) is not a market equilibrium, the excess demand z j = x j − 1 is non-zero for at least one good j ∈ G.
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Let us consider a concept of strong approximate market equilibrium [16] . It relaxes only the market clearing constraint but not the condition that x i is a demand for each agent i.
Definition 1.2.
A pair (p, x) is a μ-approximate equilibrium (μ ≥ 1) if (1) for each agent i, x i is a demand of agent i at prices p, and (2) i x i j ≤ μ i w i j for each good j.
In Fisher markets [8] , agents are divided into buyers and sellers. Each buyer i comes with an initial endowment of money B i . Each seller i has an initial endowment of goods w i . Each buyer has no value for money and is only interested in buying goods, and each seller is only interested in obtaining money. Fisher markets are a special case of exchange markets when we interpret money as a separate good.
Note that if we scale all prices in p by a positive constant c > 0, the demands stay unaffected, as income and spending scale exactly by c. Hence, the equilibrium conditions for exact and approximate equilibria are invariant under such scaling. In the classes of markets we study here, there is always an exact equilibrium with strictly positive prices. As such, we will normalize our price vectors throughout and assume that the smallest price min j p j = 1.
Utility functions. Algorithms for computing market equilibria rely on structural properties of the utility functions. A natural class are linear utilities when each agent i has non-negative values u i j ≥ 0 for each good j ∈ G, and u i (x) = j ∈G u i j x i j . As a generalization, we consider spending constraint utilities [24] , where the utility derived by agent i from good j is given by a piecewise linear concave (PLC) function f i j . The overall utility of agent i is additively separable among goods (i.e., u i (x) = j ∈G f i j (x i j )). Each f i j is a PLC function with a number of linear segments. Each segment k has two parameters: the rate of utility u i jk per unit of good derived on segment k and the maximum fraction 4 B i jk of budget that can be spent on segment k. 5 All B i jk are strictly positive, and concavity implies u i jk > u i j (k+1) . Here we assume that all u i jk 's are integers, all B i jk , w i j 's are rational numbers, and the whole input can be represented in no more than L bits. Markets with spending constraint utilities have an equilibrium composed of rational numbers under mild sufficiency conditions (see Section 3 for details).
WGS markets.
More generally, we consider non-decreasing utility functions that generate markets with the WGS property-when we increase a price of some good j, the demand for unaffected goods does not strictly decrease. If the demand function of each agent is continues and differentiable, then WGS property can be written as ∂x j ∂p j ≥ 0, ∀j j . Note that this also implies that increasing the price of a subset of goods will result in the complementary set having nondecreasing demand, because one can increase the prices one by one and apply the WGS property sequentially. For general WGS markets, we will assume that all demand bundles of agents are unique. Prominent examples are markets with Cobb-Douglas utilities
with u i j > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1. Note that in such markets, even if all utility and endowment parameters are rationals of finite size, the demand bundles and the market equilibrium might involve irrational numbers. In this case, we are interested in approximate 4 Since, unlike Fisher markets, the budget of an agent in exchange markets depends on the prices of goods, the second parameter of a segment is defined as the fraction of the agent's budget that can be spent on that segment. In addition, we note that the spending constraint utilities are different from the other well-studied separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) utilities [33] . In SPLC, each linear segment k has two parameters: the rate of utility and the maximum amount of good that can be bought on k . However, unlike the spending constraint utilities, equilibrium computation in markets with SPLC utilities is PPAD-complete [9, 50] . 5 Suppose agent i decides to spend a fraction B i j of his budget on good j. The budget constraint implies that the agent gets a utility u i j1 per unit of good j only for the amount bought by the first B i j1 -fraction of his money, then u i j2 per unit for amount bought by the next B i j2 -fraction of his money, and so on, until B i j is reached. market equilibria, and our prices will use a pre-specified precision depending on the desired approximation factor.
Oracles. Our algorithm queries demands for the agents by publishing prices p. Then an oracle returns the total demand x j for each good j ∈ G. It assumes that each agent can sell his initial endowment at the given prices and then requests a utility-maximizing bundle of goods for the money he has available. For ease of notation, given any price vector p, let O(p) denote the surplus vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s m ) for the return of the oracle, where s j = p j z j is the surplus (in terms of money) of good j ∈ G. In other words, assuming that we publish p, the oracle returns an excess demand
In general WGS markets, the surplus vector might contain irrational values. Thus, we use an approximate demand oracle O(p, μ), which is a blackbox algorithm that takes any price vector p and positive rational μ as input. It returns a surplus vector s such that |s i − O(p) i | ≤ μ holds for every good i. Note that for many WGS markets, the demand oracle can be implemented very quicklyfor CES utilities, there are even closed-form expressions for the demand of each agent for each good as a function of prices, utility, and endowment. More generally, we assume that the oracle can be implemented in time polynomial in the input size and log 1/μ. This standard assumption for demand oracles has also been used in previous work [15, 16] .
In linear and spending constraint markets, a major challenge for an algorithm in unknown markets is non-uniqueness of demands. Here, an oracle needs to do tie breaking between several different bundles of goods that yield the same maximum utility for an agent. Ideally, it should satisfy the following properties: (1) the output demand is always deterministic and unique; (2) if p are equilibrium prices, the output demand equals supply for every good; and (3) the oracle can be implemented in time polynomial in the input size. Based on these criteria, we use a demand oracle that yields demands minimizing the 2 -norm of the surplus vector. More formally, for prices p, our oracle returns a set of demand bundles for the agents such that i s 2 i is minimized, where s i is the surplus of good i. Such a tie-breaking rule was introduced by Devanur et al. [23] , and it has been later used in several market algorithms, such as those presented in other works [25, 26, 49] . This oracle satisfies all three properties. Furthermore, if utilities, endowments, and prices are all given as integers with a number of bits polynomial in m and L, we can represent every surplus s i also with a number of bits polynomial in m and L. Hence, by setting μ sufficiently small, we can convert an approximate demand oracle O into an exact oracle in polynomial time. Therefore, we will assume that in spending constraint markets, we are equipped with an exact demand oracle O instead of an approximate one.
Results and Contribution
We present simple ascending-price algorithms that converge to market equilibrium in WGS and spending constraint markets. Our algorithm for WGS markets in Section 2 converges to a (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium in time polynomial in m, log 1/ε, and other market parameters. In our algorithm, the number of agents, the agents' endowment, and utilities are initially all unknown. We only query a global demand oracle that provides aggregate demands for goods at given prices. This information is then used to increase prices of a selected set of goods whose demand is more than their supply. In Section 2, we ignore for simplicity all precision and representation issues to highlight the general proof technique. The complete analysis with all details of our algorithm is provided in Appendix A, where we specify in advance a precision for prices and rely on 37:6 X. Bei et al.
approximate demand oracles whose output is within our desired bit precision. One can view our algorithm as a particular form of tâtonnement. It improves over previous approaches for WGS markets [15, 31] by decreasing the dependence of the running time to log 1/ε, by working directly with aggregate demands without transformations like adding auxiliary agents, and by providing a strong guarantee on the optimality of individual bundles.
Next, we apply our approach in Section 3 to spending constraint utilities-a PLC generalization of linear utilities, which has many additional applications due to its natural diminishing returns property. Since these markets have demands that are non-continuous in the prices, we cannot directly apply our algorithm or other previous algorithms for WGS markets. Instead, we adjust our approach to implicitly capture the non-continuity events when using a global demand oracle with suitable tie breaking. When all parameters are represented by at most L bits, our algorithm computes even an exact market equilibrium in time polynomial in m and L. All prices and demands occurring during the algorithm require a bit precision polynomial in m and L. It first computes a (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium using a precision that is polynomial in m, L, and log 1/ε. The exact demands returned by the demand oracle have the same precision. For a small enough ε (using only polynomial bit length), we can then use a rounding procedure to turn it into a price vector of an exact market equilibrium.
Note that our algorithm requires only access to a suitable demand oracle to compute an approximate equilibrium. However, in contrast to WGS markets, for spending constraint markets the oracle uses global tie breaking. To obtain an exact equilibrium, our final rounding procedure relies on full information about the utilities. Thus, we obtain in polynomial time an approximate equilibrium in unknown markets (with global tie breaking) and an exact equilibrium with full information. This represents the first polynomial-time algorithm to compute an exact market equilibrium for spending constraint utilities and settles an open question raised by Duan and Mehlhorn [26] . An important open problem is to construct efficient tâtonnement algorithms that avoid global tie breaking and full-information rounding.
We use and extend ideas of algorithms for linear markets with full information [23, 26] . These ideas were also used in spending constraint markets [24] to compute a (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium in time polynomial in m, L, and 1/ε. Roughly speaking, they are intimately tied to linear and spending constraint utilities, where they work on the agents' side and increase prices until structural changes occur in the optimal bang-per-buck relations. The progress toward equilibrium is measured in the reduction of the 2 -norm of surplus. Our approach works for all WGS markets, which generally do not exhibit such structural events that can be used for analysis. This turns out to be much more demanding, and we developed an approach that works entirely on the goods' side, based only on prices and aggregate demands obtained via oracle access.
An issue that plays a central role in our algorithms for spending constraint utilities is precision of prices and demands. This seems to have been treated only in minor detail in some of the previous works. For the algorithm of Duan and Mehlhorn [26] in linear exchange markets, these issues are discussed in depth. Their solution is to change the agents' side and alter utility values for maintaining bounded precision throughout the algorithm. However, computing an approximate equilibrium in unknown markets with demand oracle access seems impossible via this route.
As a consequence, unlike for the existing algorithms in the linear case, the surpluses encountered by our algorithms might now become negative. Hence, additional events have to be taken into account upon increasing prices. Moreover, a significant challenge lies in maintaining the precision of prices to be polynomial throughout the algorithm. To overcome this problem, we make use of a novel tool that we term the ratio graph. This graph is defined for a vector of prices p. The goods are the vertices, and we draw an undirected edge between goods j and k if the ratio of prices p j /p k can be expressed by two L-bit numbers. For an intuition, observe that if some agent i has the same bang per buck for two goods j and k, then u i j /p j = u ik /p k or p j /p k = u i j /u ik (i.e., the ratio of prices can be expressed by two L-bit numbers). Maybe surprisingly, the broad structure of the ratio graph indeed contains enough information to implement algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in unknown spending constraint markets.
Related Work
The problem of computing market equilibria has been intensively studied, and the literature is too vast to survey here. We provide an overview of the work most directly relevant to ours. There is a large body of work on algorithms for computing equilibrium using full market information. The first combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for linear Fisher markets was given by Devanur et al. [23] . Later, Vazirani [49] provided a polynomial-time algorithm for Fisher markets with spending constraint utilities by extending combinatorial techniques of Devanur et al. [23] . Strongly polynomial-time algorithms are also known for Fisher markets with linear [43, 51] and spending constraint utilities [51] . A simplex-like polynomial time algorithm to compute an approximate equilibrium for spending constraint utilities is given in Garg et al. [34] .
For linear exchange markets, Jain [39] and Ye [53] obtained polynomial-time algorithms based on ellipsoid and interior point methods on a convex program, respectively. Duan and Mehlhorn [26] gave the first combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for this problem, which was recently improved by Duan et al. [25] . For exchange markets with spending constraint utilities, Devanur and Vazirani [24] gave an algorithm to compute a (1 + ϵ )-approximate equilibrium, for which the running time dependence on ϵ is O (1/ϵ 2 ). Eaves [28] gave a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for markets with Cobb-Douglas utilities.
For the general case of WGS markets with unique and continuous demands, a polynomial-time algorithm was obtained by Codenotti et al. [16] . Note that this algorithm relies heavily on the ellipsoid method. For the Fisher setting, the famous Eisenberg-Gale convex program [30] captures market equilibrium under linear utilities. Eisenberg [29] generalized it to work for any homogeneous utility functions, many of which satisfy the WGS property.
As an alternative approach to compute market equilibrium, tâtonnement was defined by Walras [52] -algorithms that have access to endowment and utilities only via demand oracles. Usually, tâtonnement procedures conduct price updates separately for each good, sometimes based on derivatives of the demand as a function of price. In the computer science literature, Codenotti et al. [15] gave a discrete tâtonnement process that converges to an (1 + ϵ )-approximate equilibrium for WGS markets. It has a convergence time polynomial in the input size and 1/ϵ, and it does not query the original market because one needs to add auxiliary agents. By taking a different approach, our algorithm for the same market setting improves this rate to polynomial in the input size and log 1/ϵ. In addition, we only rely on approximate demand queries to the original market.
More recently, Cole and Fleischer [19] established the first fast-converging discrete version of tâtonnement for WGS markets. The convergence time depends on various market parameters. It requires a non-zero amount of money in the market, so it works for the special case of Fisher markets and beyond, but it is not applicable to the full range of exchange markets. For Fisher markets, many additional results [6, [11] [12] [13] on the convergence of tâtonnement processes beyond WGS markets were derived.
An auction-based ascending-price algorithm to compute an approximate equilibrium in linear exchange markets was obtained by Garg and Kapoor [36] . Its running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/ϵ. Later, it was generalized to a class of WGS markets for the case of Fisher markets [37] . Another tâtonnement-style algorithm is obtained by Fleischer et al. [31] for markets where the function of prices and income that gives the maximum utility achievable is convex. It was shown that this condition is satisfied by a certain class of Fisher markets that also include non-WGS markets. However, it provides weak convergence guarantees where budget constraints are satisfied only in the aggregate sense, in which some buyers may be spending significantly more than their budget.
WGS EXCHANGE MARKETS
In this section, we describe the algorithm for WGS exchange markets. As mentioned previously, we assume that we are only granted access to an approximate demand oracle and are restricted to finite precision arithmetic computations. To make our algorithm and its analysis more accessible, we will simplify the problem in the remainder of this section by assuming that we are equipped with (1) exact real arithmetic and (2) an exact demand oracle. This significantly simplifies the analysis in terms of notation and calculations, and as such concentrates on the key ideas of the algorithm. A complete and rigorous version of this section, presenting the entire algorithm and its proof with approximate precision, can be found in Appendix A.
We apply algorithm Alg-WGS-Precise given in the following. The main idea is to repeatedly identify a subset of goods G 1 by finding a gap in the sorted order of surpluses. If no such gap exists, let G 1 be the set of goods with positive surpluses. Note that in line 6 of the algorithm, the index k always exists because the surpluses of all goods add up to zero, which means the smallest surplus is always non-positive. Thus, set G 1 can always be identified. It then raises the prices of G 1 by a common factor x until the surplus gap is closed or the smallest surplus of G 1 becomes zero. More formally, given price vector p = (p 1 , . . . ,p m ), value x ∈ R + and subset S ⊆ G, the algorithm uses Update(p, x, S ), which is the price vector p = (p 1 , . . . ,p m ) with p i = x · p i if i ∈ S and p i = p i otherwise. To implement this process, the algorithm relies on two parameters D 1 and D 2 based on the following assumptions. These two assumptions are precisely the ones from Codenotti et al. [15, 16] . Assumption 2.1 about bounded prices is fairly mild and in many cases necessary for an efficient algorithm to compute a (strong) approximate market equilibrium. Assumption 2.2 about continuity is also satisfied by many natural markets, such as markets with CES utilities with 0 < ρ < 1. Note, however, that it is not satisfied for linear and spending constraint markets, and hence we must develop new tools and procedures in Section 3.
Assumption 2.1 (Bounded Price). There exists a market equilibrium
(p * , x * ) with 1 ≤ p * i ≤ 2 D 1 , ∀i ∈ G.
Assumption 2.2 (Continuity). For any price vector
To measure progress toward equilibrium, we use a potential function
We start by proving a number of claims about the price vector p t . The first claim shows that with respect to exact demands, our algorithm monotonically reduces the 1-norm of the surpluses of all goods from 2m.
Proof. Let d i be the exact demand for good i under price p 0 , then
During round t, only prices of goods in G 1 are increased. By the WGS property, we know 
The next two claims bound the range of prices we encounter, which is important for showing that we approach the unique market equilibrium.
Claim 2.2. Throughout the run of Alg-WGS-Precise, every good with negative surplus has price 1. Hence, there will be at least one good whose price remains 1.
Proof. Observe the following three simple facts about the surplus O(p t ) resulting from exact demands. First, throughout the algorithm, we never increase the price of any good with negative surplus. Second, the surplus of any good does not change from non-negative to negative. Third, for any non-equilibrium price vector, there will always be a good with negative surplus. These facts are direct consequences of the conditions used to classify goods based on O(p t ) in the algorithm. Together they prove the claim. Proof. Let p * be equilibrium prices according to Assumption 2.1. Let t ≥ 0 be any round such that p t is pointwise no larger than p * . Let G 1 be the set as defined in the algorithm in round t, and
In the following, we will show that with p = Update(p t , x * , G 1 ), there must exist some i ∈ G 1 such that O(p) i ≤ 0. If this assertion is true, by the continuity Assumption 2.2 we know (1) there exists some x ≤ x * that satisfies the condition in Step 8, and (2) p t +1 = Update(p t , x, G 1 ) is pointwise no larger than p, which in turn is pointwise no larger than p * . Thus, the claim holds by induction.
Assume that this assertion is not true-that is,
Note that by the definition of x * , S is non-empty, and p is still pointwise no larger than p * . Next, we increase p j to p * j for every j S. Then p becomes exactly p * . By the WGS property of the market, during this process the surplus of any good in S will not decrease, and hence we still have
This contradicts the assumption that p * are prices of a market equilibrium.
The following claim establishes a relation between the surplus of a good with respect to exact demands before and after a multiplicative price update step. 
Proof. Because prices are scalable in exchange markets, we have O(x · p) = x · O(p) for any value x > 0. In addition, by the WGS property, when we decrease any set of prices, this will not increase the demand for unaffected goods. Since these goods have unaffected price and nondecreasing demand, they also enjoy non-decreasing surplus. Therefore, for any i ∈ S, we have
The next lemma is the key step in the proof of our main result. It establishes a multiplicative decrease of the potential function at the end of many of the rounds. Let R = 48e 2 in all following lemmas within this section.
Proof. We let s = O(p t −1 ) and s = O(p t ) throughout the proof. An intuition of the proof is as follows. In Alg-WGS-Precise, by the conditions used to define G 1 and G 2 , we always have
Hence, roughly speaking, every good in G 1 has reasonably large surplus, and there is a reasonably large gap between the surpluses in G 1 and G 2 . Next, at the end of the current round, we decreased the minimum surplus of a good in G 1 to either min{s (2) shown later). In both cases, the total value of Φ must decrease by at least a factor of 1 − 1/16e 2 m 3 .
More formally, if the algorithm proceeds to round t, then s > ε 2 . By the definition of set G 1 , we have s 2 , so the surpluses of goods in G 1 are similar up to a factor of e and bounded from below. In addition, we have (
Next we relate the surplus in the beginning and the end of a round as follows. For every i ∈ G 1 , by Claim 2.4, the surplus from exact demands satisfies
We do not touch the price of any good j ∈ G 2 , so the WGS property implies for exact demands s j ≥ s j . Now, to bound the change of Φ(p t ), we consider s according to G 1 and G 2 . We distinguish two cases:
In this case, the algorithm has decreased the surplus of some good in G 1 to 0. This decrease alone brings down the potential function Φ by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m). All other surpluses will cause an increase by a factor of at most 1
More formally, the contribution of goods of G 1 to Φ(p t ) can be upper bounded by
Furthermore, for every i ∈ G 2 , by the WGS property of the market, we know s i ≤ s i < 0. Thus, the contribution of goods of G 2 to Φ(p t ) can be upper bounded by Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets
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Combining equations (1) and (2),
where the last two inequalities hold for any m ≥ 2 with our choice of the value of R.
In this case, the gap between surpluses in G 1 and G 2 decreases to 0. In the following, we show that the closing of this gap yields a decrease of the potential function Φ by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m 3 ). All other surpluses will increase by a factor of at most 1 + O (1/m 3 ). In combination, it turns out that Φ will decrease by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m 3 ).
More formally, in this case, 37:12 X. Bei et al.
Now we have
Here, (3) can be derived by expanding the quadratic formula and appropriately reorganizing the terms. For the step from (3) to (4), in the first bracket we overestimate the quadratic terms of s into x 2 Φ(p t −1 ). In the second bracket, the terms are bounded correctly using s G 1 for all i ∈ G 1 and s G 2 for all j ∈ G 2 . For the final two terms in (3) and (4), we use the definition of s i k and s i k +1 and the fact that x > 1. For the step from (4) to (5), for the second bracket of (4) we note s G 1 ≥ s G 2 and the two sets G 1 and G 2 have the same sums of δ -terms. By the same argument, we can transform the last two terms of (4) as shown. From (5) to (6) and then to (7), we use the bound for i ∈G 1 δ i and (
Finally, the multiplicative term in (7) can be decreased to strictly less than 1 for every m ≥ 2 by our choice of the value of R. The final expression in (9) proves the lemma.
Observe that the previous lemma shows a decrease in the potential only for rounds in which the factor x is rather small. The next lemma shows that there can be only a limited number of rounds with a larger value of x. Proof. Let x t be the value of x we find in round t of Alg-WGS-Precise. First, because at least one price will increase by a factor of x t in round t, by Claim 2.3 we have t x t ≤ 2 mD 1 . At the end of round t, if
. Moreover, by Lemma 2.2, there will be at most O (m 4 D 1 ) such rounds. Hence, the total increase of Φ(p t ) in these rounds will be no more than a factor of
. For all other rounds, we have x < 1 + 1 Rm 3 , and by Lemma 2.1, the potential function is decreased by a factor of 1/(1 − Ω( 1 m 3 )). Therefore, the total number of rounds before Φ(p t ) ≤ ε 2 will be at most
The final step is to argue that the total running time (in terms of oracle queries) of the algorithm is polynomial. Given Lemma 2.3, it remains to show that each round only invokes polynomially many oracle queries. Intuitively, this can be achieved by searching for x in Alg-WGS-Precise via binary search. However, for a formal proof, it is unavoidable to make statements about the required bit precision of p, x, and the approximate demand oracle, which we did not discuss here. In the following, we present the statement of the main theorem. The formal proof, together with the statement of algorithm Alg-WGS based on bounded precision and full details on its analysis, is deferred to Appendix A. Remark 2.1. Our main goal in the analysis was to establish a bound on the running time that is polynomial in m, L, and log 1/ε. For the sake of simplicity, we did not optimize the bounds beyond being polynomial. It appears that the dependence on m can be significantly improved, for example, by a more precise analysis of the actual number of rounds with x ≥ 1 + 1 Rm 3 and their impact on the potential. Moreover, based on our preliminary experiments, it appears that instead of the precision parameter μ = Θ(ε/m 7 ) (for details, see Appendix A), a value of Θ(ε/m 4 ) is sufficient, and the algorithm converges to an equilibrium much faster than the bound predicts.
EXCHANGE MARKETS WITH SPENDING CONSTRAINT UTILITIES
In this section, we discuss our algorithm for exchange markets with spending constraint utilities. Spending constraint utilities are defined in Devanur and Vazirani [24] and Vazirani [49] , where the utility derived by agent i from good j is given by a PLC function f i j . The overall utility of agent i is additively separable among goods (i.e., u i (x) = j ∈G f i j (x i j )). Each f i j is a PLC function with a number of linear segments. Each segment k has two parameters: the rate of utility u i jk per unit of good derived on segment k and the maximum fraction B i jk of budget that can be spent on segment k. All B i jk are strictly positive, and concavity implies u i jk > u i j (k+1) . Here we assume all u i jk 's are integers, all B i jk , w i j 's are rational numbers, and the whole input can be represented in no more than L bits.
Spending constraint markets may not have an equilibrium [21] ; however, under mild conditions, there is always a rational equilibrium [42] . Henceforth, we will assume the following sufficient condition. Let Γ(S ) = {j ∈ G | w i j > 0, i ∈ S }. Let us first characterize the demand of each agent i under spending constraint utilities. Given nonzero prices p, define the bang -per buck relative to p for segment k in f i j to be u i jk /p j . Sort all segments of agent i by decreasing bang-per-buck value and partition them into t classes Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q t , such that segments in the same class have the same bang-per-buck value. Then an allocation is a demand bundle of agent i if and only if there is an integer t i such that all segments in partitions Q 1 , . . . , Q t i −1 are all fully allocated and no segments in partitions Q t i +1 , Q t i +2 , . . . are allocated. Furthermore, the total money spent on partitions Q 1 , . . . , Q t i −1 is no more than agent i's total budget m i = j ∈G p j w i j . We term Q t i agent i's current partition and Q 1 , . . . , Q t i −1 agent i's allocated partition. Let spent a i denote the total money of agent i spent on allocated segments, and let spent д j denote the total money spent on allocated segments of good j. Agent i can freely demand any segments in her current partition, fully or partially, until her remaining budget m i − spent a i is exhausted.
Equality graph. The main tool for the analysis of previous algorithms in spending constraint markets is an equality graph, denoted by EG (p). This graph remains completely unknown to our algorithm, but it proves useful when proving properties of the convergence process. The vertex set of this bipartite graph consists of the set of agents A and the set of goods G. Given a price vector p t , we introduce an edge from agent i to good j if and only if agent i's current partition Q t i contains one segment that belongs to utility function f i j for good j. The edges in EG (p) are called equality edges. Observe that this graph changes throughout the process when we update the price vector p t .
Based on EG (p), we can construct an equality network denoted by N (p)
Similar to Devanur et al. [23] and Vazirani [49] , we define a balanced flow as a maximum flow in
where jt is the flow along edge (j, t ), which also denotes the money spent on good j on segments of current partitions, and spent д j is the amount of money spent on allocated partitions of good j. By assumption, O(p) returns the surplus vector derived from (any) balanced flow of the network N (p). From Vazirani [49] , we know that every balanced flow gives the same surplus vector, and such surplus vector can be computed using at most n max-flow computations.
There exists an algorithm for computing exact equilibrium prices in Fisher markets with spending constraint utilities [49] . Devanur and Vazirani [24] give an FPTAS for exchange markets with spending constraint utilities. The algorithm finds an (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium in time polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
For spending constraint markets, we extend our approach for WGS markets. The challenge is that surplus can change in a non-continuous way when prices change the current partitions of the agents. However, we show how to use the linear structure of the market to get rough information about these breakpoints. In addition, we maintain prices within a polynomial precision and guarantee convergence to an approximate market equilibrium. Finally, when Φ(p) becomes small enough, we convert the approximate equilibrium to an exact one using a procedure AlgSpending-Exact.
Our only assumption is that the whole input can be represented within L bits, and L is known to the algorithm. This implies as a corollary a variant of Assumption 2.1-there is an exact market equilibrium with prices p subject to
where D 1 is a polynomial of m and L. As mentioned before, Assumption 2.2 does not hold in spending constraint markets.
The Framework
Alg-Spending specifies the general framework of our algorithm, which is similar to the approach taken previously for WGS markets but with two notable differences at lines 8 and 10. As mentioned in Section 1.1, here we do not resort to approximation parameter μ, but instead compute the exact surplus. We first analyze Alg-Spending and show that it needs only a polynomial number of rounds to converge to an approximate market equilibrium. For now, our analysis disregards all precision and representation issues. In particular, we assume to find the exact value x using binary search, irrespective of the number of bits needed for representation. In addition, the update of prices from p t −1 to p t will multiply all prices of goods in G 1 by x, irrespective of the number of bits required to represent them. In our final algorithm in the following, we will show how to address these issues to obtain a (true) polynomial-time algorithm.
The analysis of Alg-Spending proceeds roughly as in the previous section. We rely on the following lemma. (1, 1, . . . , 1) and round index t ← 0. 2 repeat //round t
Lemma 3.1. The demands returned by O(p) satisfy the WGS property.
Proof. We make use of a max-min fair property for balanced flows in linear markets proved in previous work. A vector s is called max-min fair if and only if for every feasible vector s and i such that s i < s i , there is some j with s j < s i such that s j > s j . The following claim is proved by Devanur et al. [23] .
Claim 3.1. [23] The surplus vector of a balanced flow in N (G) is max-min fair among all feasible surplus vectors.
Although this claim is for linear markets, it can also be directly applied to spending constraint markets because the network flows are designed only with respect to the current partition of each agent i. Within this domain, the spending constraint market behaves exactly like a linear market.
We proceed to prove Lemma 3.1 by contradiction to this claim. Suppose we increase the price of some good k from p k to p k + δ . We denote the old prices by p and the new prices by p . Let s = O(p) and s = O(p ). Now assume for contradiction that there exists some k such that s < s .
It is easy to verify the following properties:
(a) For any edge (i, j) in N (p) with j k, let seд be the segment in agent i's current partition that corresponds to this edge. Then with new prices p , either seд belongs to the allocated partition (i.e., is fully allocated) or seд is still in agent i's current partition (i.e., (i, j) also exists in N (p )). (b) For any edge (i, j) ∈ N (p ) with i ∈ S A and j S G , let seд be the segment in agent i's current partition that corresponds to this edge with prices p . If seд is also in i's current partition with prices p, then seд is fully allocated with price p (otherwise, agent i can reroute some flow from S G to this segment to obtain a more balanced flow 7 in N (p)). If seд is not in i's current partition with price p, then all segments in i's current partition with price p must be fully allocated in the demand allocation with prices p . 7 Here "more balanced" means the new flow has a smaller value of j ∈G ( jt + spent д j − p j ) 2 .
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The preceding two observations imply that with prices p , we can rearrange flows from S A to S G to get a new feasible surplus vector s such that for all j ∈ S G , s j ≥ s j , and for all other edges j S G , s j = s j . In particular, we have s j ≥ s j ≥ s > s for all j ∈ S G . This contradicts the fact that s is max-min fair and proves Lemma 3.1. Now the following properties can be proved using literally the same proofs as for WGS markets before. Again we set the constant R = 48e 2 . We also show a version of Claim 2.2 for spending constraint markets, which needs some extra work. Unlike for WGS markets, the surplus of a good can change from non-negative to negative. Thus, the proof of Claim 2.2 does not directly transfer to spending constraint markets. Instead, we first show the following.
Claim 3.3. Let S t be the set of goods with negative surplus and price strictly greater than 1 at the end of round t in Alg-Spending. For any T ⊆ S t , let Γ(T , p t ) be the neighbors of set T in EG (p t )-for instance, Γ(T , p t ) is the set of agents who are interested in at least one good in T under price p t . Let B(Γ(T , p t )) be the sum of budgets of agents in Γ(T , p t ). Then we have B(Γ(T
Proof. We prove this claim by induction. The claim is trivially true for round 0. Assume that it is true for any round t ≤ t , then at the end of round t = t + 1, consider two cases:
• min{s i | i ∈ G 1 } ≥ 0. Because the surplus of any good in G 2 is non-decreasing in round t, we have S t ⊆ S t −1 . Further, the algorithm does not increase the price of any good in T in round t. Hence, we also have Γ(T , p t −1 ) ⊆ Γ(T , p t ). By the induction assumption, we have
Assume that during this round we start from x = 1 and increase x continuously until it reaches its final value. We also assume that the equality graph EG (Update(p t −1 , x, G 1 )) and the corresponding balanced flow are implicitly being maintained throughout the process. For each agent i and any moment during this round, let Γ(i) denote the neighbors of agent i in the equality graph. There are two cases:
This means agent i's current partition contains segments of goods in both G 1 and G 2 . When we continue to increase x (and consequently the prices of goods in G 1 ), the segments of goods in G 1 will have worse bang-per-buck value than segments of goods in G 2 . Hence, they will be removed from agent i's current partition. Furthermore, for any good j 1 ∈ Γ(i) ∩ G 1 and j 2 ∈ Γ(i) ∩ G 2 , because we have s j 1 > s j 2 and the balanced flow condition, it cannot happen that i j 1 > 0 and i j 2 < c i j 2 . Otherwise, agent i would be able to route some flow from edge (i, j 1 ) to edge (i, j 2 ) to reach a more balanced flow. Thus, two possibilities remain: -i j 2 = c i j 2 for every j 2 ∈ Γ(i) ∩ G 2 . This means that all segments of goods in G 2 are already fully allocated. When x increases, the new current partition of agent i will only contain segments of goods in Γ(i) ∩ G 1 , and the surpluses will change continuously with the change of x. -i j 1 = 0 for every j 1 ∈ Γ(i) ∩ G 1 . This means that when x increases, the segments that are being removed from i's current partition are all unallocated in the current allocation. Hence, the surpluses will again change continuously at the current point.
In summary, in this case, the change of the surpluses will always be continuous in the change of x. Note that when the surpluses are changing continuously, Case 2 cannot occur before Case 1 happens. Therefore, the claim follows via Case 1.
This means that we will always change the prices of all segments in i's current partition by the same rate. Hence, if set Q t i changes, it can only be merged with some segments in Q t i −1 or Q t i +1 . In either case, the final value of x must be at a point where at least one new edge emerges in the equality graph EG (p t ) from Γ(G 1 ) ⊆ A (the set of agents incident to at least one good in G 1 ) to G 2 . Suppose we alter the equality graph by removing these emerging edges from EG (p t ). If we recompute the balanced flow, then
In this new graph, let Γ (T 1 ) be the set of agents who have positive flow to at least one good in T 1 , and let Γ (T 2 ) be the set of agents incident to at least one good in T 2 . Since min{s i | i ∈ T 1 } > max{s i | i ∈ T 2 }, by the balanced flow condition we know Γ (T 1 ) ∩ Γ (T 2 ) = ∅. In addition, we have B(Γ (T 1 )) > i ∈T 1 (p t ) i because every good in T 1 has positive surplus, and B(Γ (T 2 )) > i ∈T 2 (p t ) i because the claim is true in round t − 1. Combining these two inequalities gives us B(Γ(T , p t )) > i ∈T (p t ) i .
Corollary 3.2. At the end of each round t in Alg-Spending, for any good i with negative surplus and price greater than 1, there exists another good j with price 1 that is connected to i in EG (p t )
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the statement is false. Let T be the set of goods with negative surplus and connected with good i in EG (p t ). By the balanced flow condition, none of the agents in Γ(T , p t ) can have any positive flow to goods outside set T . Thus, we have 0
We obtain the following corollary, an analog of Claim 2.2 for spending constraint markets. The set of properties shown so far allows to establish the following lemma, which is the key step for observing convergence to equilibrium. It can be seen as an adjustment of Lemma 2.1 to spending constraint markets.
Proof. Our proof uses the arguments of the proof for Lemma 2.1. We consider two cases:
. This case can be verified by observing that Claim A.4 holds with μ = 0. Then the proof follows using exactly the same proof as for Lemma 2.1.
Case 2: min{s
. Using the same argument as in the proof of Claim 3.3, one can show that in this case x must be at a point where at least one new edge emerges in the equality graph EG (p t ) from Γ(G 1 ) ⊆ A. Without these emerging edges, we have min{s i | i ∈ G 1 } ≥ max{s i | i ∈ G 2 }. This means that we can further reduce the flows along the new edges to get another feasible flow in N (p t ) such that with the resulting surplus vector s , we have min{s
Next, using again the same proof as for Lemma 2.1, for our choice of the value of constant R it follows that s 2 ≤ Φ(p t −1 )(1 − 37:18 X. Bei et al. 
9 end 10 return p
Precision and Representation
It is now tempting to think that using a similar argument as in the general WGS case, Claim 3.2, Corollary 3.3, and Lemma 3.4 provide an algorithm that converges to an approximate market equilibrium in polynomial time. However, an issue arises with regard to the precision and representation of the prices: In each round, x could potentially be a rational number involving prices and surpluses, and after multiplying each price in G 1 by x, the bit length to represent a price can double in one round. This means that after a polynomial number of rounds, we may require an exponential number of bits to represent the prices of some goods and the desired factor x.
Ratio graph. The reason for defining such ratio graph is that, although the equality subgraph with respect to a price vector is unknown to us, we can use the ratio graph, which can be computed using only the price vector and the input size bound, to retrieve some information about the hidden structure of the equality subgraph. Proof. If good i and good j are connected in EG (p), then there exist goods i = i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i k−1 , i k = j such that for each t < k, there exists some agent a t that has the same bang per buck for two segments for goods i t and i t +1 , respectively. Then we have p i t /p i t +1 = u a t i t k 1 /u a t i t +1 k 2 for some k 1 and k 2 . This is a ratio of two integers, each of value at most 2 L − 1. This implies (i t , i t +1 ) ∈ RG (M, p), so i and j are connected in RG (M, p).
As an adjustment, we run the following procedure Rounding(p, M ) at the end of each iteration of the main loop in Alg-Spending. Its purpose is to round the prices within polynomial bit length while maintaining the structure of equality and ratio graphs. Thereby, we will show that the value of potential function Φ(p) will not be increased dramatically.
Our new algorithm Alg-Spending-Rounding is simply the framework Alg-Spending with the following modifications:
(1) Set M = log 2 5m 7 ε 2 . In each round, binary search 
Proof. Property (a) holds since we never increase the price of goods in set C 1 , and property (b) can be derived based on property (a) and the fact that RG (M, p ) is connected when the algorithm terminates.
Next we claim that for any i, j, there does not exist any x ∈ P such that p i /p j ≤ x < p i /p j . This is because by design, p i /p j has to reach x in some iteration before it grows beyond x. But starting from that moment until the end of the algorithm, i and j will be connected in RG (M, p). The ratios between two prices in the same connected component in RG (M, p) remain unchanged. Hence, p i /p j will never grow beyond x.
This claim also proves property (c). By Claim 3.4, a pair of goods i and j connected in EG (p) remain connected in RG (M, p). Hence, their ratio of prices will remain the same in p , and they are connected in EG (p ).
For property (d), according to the algorithm, no price will decrease from p to p . Next, number the goods such that p 1 
Finally, in each iteration, we add at least one edge between two connected components in RG (M, p) . Thus, the algorithm will terminate after at most m − 1 iterations, and it is easy to check that each iteration runs in polynomial time. This proves the claim.
Once the prices are bounded by a fixed polynomial bit length, we can also bound the length needed to encode the desired x in each round. This implies that we can find x in the framework in polynomial time using binary search. Lemma 3.7. In every round of Alg-Spending-Rounding, the desired x can be represented as a ratio of two integers, each of value at most 2 mM+L+2 log m − 1.
Proof. Let p = p t −1 and consider the structure of EG (p). We let A 1 = Γ(G 1 ) be the agents connected to goods in G 1 . In addition, let A 2 = A \ A 1 . There is no (i, j) ∈ EG (p) with i ∈ A 1 and j ∈ G 2 , as otherwise O(p t −1 ) could increase the money spent on goods in G 2 and further decrease Φ(p t −1 ). For simplicity, we will also assume that there is no edge (i, j) ∈ A 2 × G 1 , as no agent spends money along these edges and they immediately disappear once we start increasing prices in G 1 . Now we increase p on goods in j ∈ G 1 by x and get a new price vector p(x ). This only generates new edges (i, j) ∈ A 1 × G 2 . Furthermore, we drop only edges (i, j) ∈ A 1 × G 1 . To verify this, let us consider the other possibilities. The relation between marginal utility values u i jk /p j and u i j k /p j for goods in j, j ∈ G 1 does not change, as both p j and p k are both multiplied by x. Hence, there are no new edges (i, j) ∈ A 1 × G 1 . For the same reason, there are no new edges (i, j) ∈ A 2 × G 2 . The bang per buck of goods in G 1 decreases, so we also do not introduce edges (i, j) ∈ A 2 × G 1 . In fact, this also implies that we do not drop any edges (i, j) ∈ A 2 × G 2 -prices and bang-per-buck relations among goods in G 2 do not change at all, and G 2 becomes more attractive compared to 37:20 X. Bei et al.
that could be removed. This shows that we only generate new edges between A 1 and G 2 , and we only drop edges between A 1 and G 1 .
For any given x, consider the residual graph of N (Update(p, x, G 1 )). Let C be an arbitrary connected component in this graph. Let C A be the set of agents in C and C G be the set of goods in C. Then we know that all goods in C G have the same surplus, and all flow going through C G comes from agents in C A . This implies the following equation:
where s is the surplus of (any) good in this component. Now let us focus on the moment where x reaches the desired value at the end of round t according to the algorithm. At this moment, one of the following properties must hold:
(1) min{s i | i ∈ G 1 } = 0. Then for the connected component that contains a good of surplus 0, we have s = 0 in the preceding equation. All initial prices p i are ratios of integers with values at most 2 mM , so when we solve the equation for x, the solution is a ratio of two integers with value at most m2 mM = 2 mM+log m .
In this case, we have two possibilities:
-There exist two connected components in the residual graph of N (Update(p, x, G 1 )) that have the same surplus. Applying the preceding equation to these two components, we can solve for x, and the solution will be a ratio of two integers with value at most
. p i j and p k can be represented as ratio of integers of value at most 2 mM by Lemma 3.6, and u i j and u ik are both integers of value at most 2 L − 1. Hence, every value of x at which a new edge evolves in EG (p(x )) can be presented as a ratio of integers of value at most 2 2mM+L .
We now bound the impact of replacing p t by Rounding(p t , M ) in the function Φ(p t ).
Proof. Let p t = Rounding(p t , M ). By Lemma 3.6(c), we know this rounding procedure does not remove any edges in EG (p t ). Let f be a balanced flow in N (p t ). Then by Lemma 3.6(d), we can construct a feasible flow
Let s be the surplus vector derived from f , then we have
Note that s is just one feasible surplus vector for price vector p t , and Φ(p t ) minimizes the 2 -norm of surpluses among all feasible surplus vectors. Hence,
This proves the lemma.
Rounding can be used to obtain an algorithm that converges to an approximate market equilibrium in polynomial time. Proof. In the Alg-Spending framework with Alg-Spending-Rounding, we know by Lemma 3.4 that at the end of each round t and before calling Rounding,
. This implies that we can employ the same proof as for Theorem 2.4 to show that after finishing Alg-Spending-Rounding, we arrive at a (1 + ε)-approximate market equilibrium. Because M is a polynomial in the input size and log 1/ε, the binary search and the Rounding procedure run in polynomial time in each round of the framework. Hence, the running time is polynomial in the input size and log 1/ε.
Finally, it remains to convert the approximate equilibrium to an exact one. To achieve this, we rely on full information about the spending constraint utilities. Although this step can be seen as an extension of the technique developed in the work of Duan and Mehlhorn [26] for the linear exchange markets, there are several challenges due to the much more involved setting of spending constraint utilities, where the allocated partitions make the remaining budgets of agents and the values of goods dependent on too many parameters. Using a more involved procedure, we are able to handle the extra complexity of the problem. Our result resolves an open question of Duan and Mehlhorn [26] of finding an exact polynomial-time algorithm for exchange markets with spending constraint utilities. A detailed discussion of this final step can be found in Appendix B. This yields the final theorem in this section. 
APPENDIX A WGS EXCHANGE MARKETS WITH APPROXIMATE PRECISION
In this section, we describe the complete algorithm Alg-WGS for WGS exchange markets. Recall the assumptions from Section 2, which we restate here for completeness. Throughout the analysis and proofs that follow, if s = O(p) for some p, we uses to denote the surplus vector returned by the μ-approximation demand oracle with the same price vector (i.e., s = O(p, μ)). We proceed along similar lines as in Section 2, and the proofs of the first claims closely resemble the versions for the exact oracle. For completeness, we provide them here for the approximate oracle. 
1 Set initial price p 0 ← (1, 1, . . . , 1) and round index t ← 0.
Binary search the largest x ∈ P such that ins During round t, only prices of goods in G 1 are increased. By the WGS property, we know
Hence, we do not introduce any new negative surplus in O(p t ). Thus, we have
The next two claims bound the range of prices we encounter, which is important for showing that we approach the unique market equilibrium. Claim A.2. Throughout the run of Alg-WGS, every good with negative surplus has price 1. Hence, there will be at least one good whose price remains 1.
Proof. Observe the following three simple facts about the surplus O(p t ) resulting from exact demands. First, throughout the algorithm, we never increase the price of any good with negative surplus. Second, the surplus of any good does not change from non-negative to negative. Third, for any non-equilibrium price vector, there will always be a good with negative surplus. These facts are direct consequences of the conditions used to classify goods based on O(p t ) in the algorithm. Together they prove the claim. Proof. Let p * be equilibrium prices according to Assumption 2.1. We show that for any t ≥ 0, p t is always pointwise smaller than p * . Assume that this is not true, and let t be the smallest value such that there exists (p t ) i > p * i for some i. Note that according to the algorithm, we have p t = Update(p t −1 , x, G 1 ) for some x > 1 and G 1 ⊆ [m]. Further, by our classification based on O,
37:23
it is easy to see that O(p t ) i > 0 for any i ∈ G 1 . This means from p t −1 to p t , only prices of goods in G 1 are increased. Let S = {i | (p t ) i > p * i }, then we have S ⊆ G 1 . Next, we apply a sequence of price changes to p t . First, for every j S, we increase (p t ) j to p * j . Let p be the new price vector, and consider the surplus O(p) resulting from exact demands. By the WGS property of the market, the surplus of any good in S will not decrease, and hence we still have O(p) i > 0 for every i ∈ S. The sum of all surpluses in an exchange market is always 0, so j S O(p) j < 0. Now, we decrease the price of every good i ∈ S from p i to p * i . Then, p becomes exactly p * . This process will not increase surplus of any good j S. Thus, we still have j S O(p * ) j < 0. This contradicts the assumption that p * are prices of a market equilibrium.
At this point, let us recall Claim 2.4 that establishes a relation between the exact surplus of a good before and after a multiplicative price update step. It does not involve the approximate oracle.
Next, we establish a statement about the surpluses at the end of each round, which was not necessary for the version with exact oracles and precision. Intuitively, we increase the prices of goods in G 1 until the minimum surplus in G 1 reaches the maximum surplus in G 2 or 0. Note that μ is very small and can be thought of as 0. The main complication here is that we need to work with μ-approximation demands in the algorithm and the resulting surpluses s .
Claim A.4. At the end of each round in Alg-WGS, min{s
Proof. According to the binary search procedure, we know that if we increase prices in G 1 by a factor of x, thens satisfies the condition min{s 
for every i, where the last inequality is derived by Claim A.3. Thus,
We are now ready for the key lemma in the proof of the main result-the multiplicative decrease of the potential function at the end of each round.
Proof. We use the following notation. Let
The intuition of the proof is similar to the version with exact precision. By the conditions used to define G 1 and G 2 , we always haves i k ≥s i 1 /e ands i k −s i k +1 >s i k /(m + 1) ≥s i 1 /e (m + 1). Hence, roughly speaking, every good in G 1 has reasonably large surplus, and there is a reasonably large gap between the surpluses in G 1 and G 2 . Next, at the end of the current round, we decreased the minimum surplus of a good in G 1 to either min{s (2) shown later). In both cases, the total value of Φ must decrease by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m 3 ).
More formally, if the algorithm proceeds to round t, then s > ε 2 . By the definition of set G 1 , we haves 2 , so the surpluses of goods in G 1 are similar up to a factor of e and bounded from below. In addition, we have (
Since we rely on an approximate demand oracle, the surpluses of goods in G 1 might not change in a monotone fashion when increasing their prices. Nevertheless, we can relate the surplus in the beginning and the end of a round as follows. For every i ∈ G 1 , by Claim 2.4, the surplus from exact demands satisfies s i ≤ x · s i . Thus,
. This means that the increase within a round is bounded bys i < (1 + 2 R 2 m 3 )s i . Since we do not touch the price of any good j ∈ G 2 , the WGS property implies for exact demands s j ≥ s j . Hence,s j ≥s j − 2μ. Now, to bound the change of Φ(p t ), we considers according to G 1 and G 2 . We distinguish two cases:
Intuitively, in this case, the algorithm has decreased the surplus of some good in G 1 to approximately 0 (recall that μ is sufficiently small). This decrease alone brings down the potential function Φ by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m). All other surpluses will cause an increase by a factor of at most 1 + O (1/m 3 ).
More formally, Claim A.4 gives us μ < min{s i | i ∈ G 1 } < 7μ. Hence, the contribution of goods of G 1 to Φ(p t ) can be upper bounded by
Furthermore, for every i ∈ G 2 , if −m 3 μ ≤s i ≤ μ, we haves 2 i ≤ m 6 μ 2 , and ifs i < −μ, by the WGS property of the market, we know s i ≤ s i ≤s i + μ < 0. Thus, sinces j ≥s j − 2μ,
Hence, the contribution of goods of G 2 to Φ(p t ) can be upper bounded by m j=k+1s
Combining Equations (10) and (11), Case 2:
Intuitively, in this case, the gap between surpluses in G 1 and G 2 decreases to approximately 0. In the following, we show that the closing this gap yields a decrease of the potential function Φ by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m 3 ). All other surpluses will increase by a factor of at most 1 + O (1/m 3 ). In combination, it turns out that Φ will decrease by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m 3 ).
More formally, in this case, min{s 
Now we have
Here, (12) can be derived by expanding the quadratic formula and appropriately reorganizing the terms. For the step from (12) to (13) , in the first bracket we overestimate the quadratic terms of s into x 2 Φ(p t −1 ) and |G 2 | by m. In the second bracket, we return tos i ands j , which in turn are bounded correctly using s G 1 for all i ∈ G 1 and s G 2 for all j ∈ G 2 . For the final two terms in (12) and (13), we use the definition ofs i k ands i k +1 and the fact that x > 1. For the step from (13) to (14) , for the first bracket of (13) we uses j ≥s m for every j ∈ G 2 . For the second bracket of (13), we notes G 1 ≥s G 2 and the difference between the sums of δ -terms is bounded by 4mμ as noted earlier. By the same argument, we can transform the last two terms of (13) as shown. Note that we simply drop −2μ j ∈G 2 δ j < 0. From (14) to (15) D 1 ) such rounds. Hence, the total increase of Φ(p t ) in these rounds will be no more than a factor of
. For all other rounds, we have x < 1 + 1 R 2 m 3 , and by Lemma A.1, the potential function is decreased by a factor of 1/(1 − Ω( 1 m 3 )). Therefore, the total number of rounds before Φ(p t ) ≤ ε 2 will be at most
In each round, the number of queries to the oracle is no more than O (log Δ)
We conclude that the total number of queries during the algorithm is
, which is a polynomial in the input size and log 1/ε.
B EXACT EQUILIBRIUM FOR EXCHANGE MARKETS WITH SPENDING
CONSTRAINT UTILITIES Here we show how to obtain an exact market equilibrium in exchange spending constraint markets. Using the Alg-Spending-Exact framework, we convert the approximate market equilibrium obtained in Section 3.2 into an exact equilibrium. To achieve this, we rely on the full information of the spending constraint utilities. This step is an extension of the technique developed in the work of Duan and Mehlhorn [26] for the linear exchange markets. However, there are several challenges due to the much more involved setting of spending constraint utilities, where the allocated partitions make the remaining budgets of agents and the values of goods dependent on too many parameters. In the following, we present how to handle the extra complexity of the problem, and this result resolves an open question of Duan and Mehlhorn [26] of finding an exact polynomial-time algorithm for exchange markets with spending constraint utilities.
Let p be the price vector of an (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium. We first construct a bipartite graph EG (p) = (A ∪ G, E) , where the edge set E is a union of equality edges in EG (p), edges due to positive endowments, and edges due to allocated segments. The main idea here is to construct a set of components of agents and goods such that there is no interaction across the components. In addition, we want at least one good with price 1 in every such component. To achieve this latter condition, whenever there is a component C of EG (p) without a good with price 1, we raise the prices of goods in C by a common factor x > 1 until a new equality edge appears. By Assumption 3.1, a new equality edge will always emerge in during this procedure because prices of goods in C are increasing, which makes goods outside C more and more attractive to the agents in C.
The next lemma shows that the updated price vector after the price increase still remains a (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium.
Lemma B.1. The price vector p at the end of the while loop in Alg-Spending-Exact is a (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium.
Proof. Note that we increase prices of goods in a component C when each good has price greater than 1. Corollary 3.2 implies that the surplus of each good in C is 0. Hence, the old allocation will still be feasible after the price change, and the surpluses remain the same. Therefore, the updated p will remain a (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium.
At this stage, we can assume that each component of EG (p) has a good with price 1. We then work on each component of EG (p) separately. We assume for convenience that EG (p) is a single component.
Next we set up a system of linear equations in price variables of the form Ap = b and show that the matrix A has full rank. Finally, we show that by perturbing the vector b slightly, we can get an exact equilibrium. Consider the components of EG (p), for instance, after removing edges due to endowment and allocated segments from EG (p). Let C 1 , . . . ,C K be the set of components of EG (p). In each C l , 1 ≤ l ≤ K, all goods are connected with each other through a set of equality edges. Whenever there are two current segments (i, j, k ) and (i, j , k ) of the same agent i, we have the following relation between the prices of goods j and j :
This implies that for each component C l , |C l ∩ G | − 1 of these equations are linearly independent, and there is essentially one free price variable. Further, since there is no money flow across components with respect to the current allocations, we have the budget balance condition for each component:
Remaining worth of goods -remaining budgets of agents (after allocated segments) = sum of surpluses.
For component C l , the condition reads Since p h ≥ 1 for every h, if some N lh is non-zero for l ≤ K and h > K , then the right-hand side is at most −1/2 3mL , which is a contradiction. It implies that N lh 0 if and only if both l and h are either less than or equal to K or larger than K . Let A 1 and G 1 denote the set of agents and goods of components C 1 , . . . ,C K , respectively. Let A 2 = A \ A 1 and G 2 = G \ G 1 . We can further conclude the following:
• w i j = 0 for every i ∈ A 1 , j ∈ G 2 , and otherwise N lh 0 for l ≤ K and h > K . Similarly, w i j = 0 for every i ∈ A 2 , j ∈ G 1 .
• Agents in A 1 have no allocated goods in G 2 , and otherwise budget balance equations of components C l , l > K will have some non-zero p j , 1 ≤ j ≤ K and that will make N lh 0 for l > K and h ≤ K . Similarly, agents in A 2 have no allocated goods in G 1 .
This is impossible because we have assumed that EG (p) consists of one single component. Therefore, N must have full rank.
Overall, we have established that Equations of (18), (19) , and p i = 1 are linearly independent. We can write this system in the matrix form as Ap = b, where A is invertible and all entries are rational numbers with common denominator at most 2 2L .
Consider the system Ap = b for a price vector p , where b is a unit vector with a one in the row corresponding to the equation p i = 1. Next we show that p gives an exact equilibrium. For that, we need to show the following: 
